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The effects of ownership change on bank performance
and risk exposure: Evidence from Indonesia
Abstract
This study investigates the effects of ownership change on the performance and
exposure to risk of 60 Indonesian commercial banks over the period 2005-2012. We
find that state-owned banks tend to be less profitable and more exposed to risk than
private and foreign banks. Domestic investors tend to select the best performers
for acquisition. Domestic acquisition is generally associated with a decrease in the
efficiency of the acquired banks. Non-regional foreign acquisition is associated with
a reduction in risk exposure. Acquisition by regional foreign investors is associated
with performance gains.
Keywords. Bank; Efficiency; Ownership; Governance; M&A; Foreign acquisition; Pri-
vatization; Indonesia
JEL classification: G21; G28; G34; F36
1
1 Introduction
Emerging and developing economies continue to grow at higher rates compared to de-
veloped economies. Economic reforms, financial development, financial integration, pri-
vatization, liberalization and consolidation among other trends have characterized these
economies since the late 1980s. Investors seeking higher rates of growth or diversification
were encouraged to enter emerging markets to capitalize on the abundant opportunities
available. Banking sectors in emerging economies often play a vital role in the success
or failure of such initiatives. Thus, they attract ample attention, especially because of
the rich and complex environment brought on by dynamic and rapid changes in bank
ownership. Such changes often provide useful empirical evidence on the impact of many
significant factors affecting banks and the wider economy such as inter alia privatization,
liberalization, financial development, and governance.
An important strand of the literature examines performance discrepancies between
the three major types of bank ownership (state-owned, private or foreign). These studies
tend to focus primarily on the static (short-term) effects of ownership and often ignore
the dynamic (long-term) effects of ownership change. More importantly, a lack of detailed
and reliable data is a common obstacle for researchers trying to conduct in-depth analysis.
Furthermore, despite the vast literature on the effects of foreign ownership and foreign
banks’ entry into emerging markets, many studies fail to distinguish between different
types of foreign ownership, for instance whether foreign investors are regional or non-
regional.
Indonesia is a major emerging market in the Asia-Pacific region with a diverse land-
scape and a rich mix of cultures and ethnicities. It is the sixth-largest economy in the
region, with a nominal GDP of US$888.5 billion in 2014, and it is the fourth most popu-
lous country in the world with a population estimated at 252.8 million, according to the
World Bank (2014). The Indonesian financial sector is dominated by the banking sector,
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which represents 77.9% of the total assets of the financial system (Bank Indonesia, 2013).1
Similarly to other emerging economies, the Indonesian economy is characterized by weak
institutions, weak law enforcement, corruption and politically directed lending (Hofman
et al., 2004; Temple, 2003).
Over recent years, the country has experienced a surge in bank mergers and acqui-
sitions (M&A) driven by structural, regulatory, and market forces. First, following the
Asian financial crisis, M&A activity has been driven by government policy initiatives for
restructuring and consolidating the banking industry. Second, bank ownership rules were
introduced in 2006 to incentivize a bank shareholder with controlling stakes in more than
one bank to merge the banks under its control. M&As are officially encouraged to prepare
banks for greater competition brought on by regional financial integration and improved
access to banking markets.2 Last, the Indonesian banking sector’s average profitability is
one of the highest in the region, which makes investing in Indonesian banks particularly
attractive to foreign investors (Trinugroho et al., 2014).
The implications of the recent wave of Indonesian banks’ M&As on performance and
risk are worth investigating. Not least because the empirical literature often provides
ambiguous and country-specific evidence on whether a particular type of ownership gen-
erates superior performance compared to the others. This paper aims to contribute to
this literature by investigating the effects of bank ownership on the performance and ex-
posure to risk of Indonesian banks. We distinguish between static, selection, and dynamic
ownership effects. In doing so, we aim to answer the following questions: What are the
performance and risk characteristics of banks targeted for M&A? Do different types of
ownership have different effects on the performance and risk exposure of target banks in
the short- and long-term? Do regional foreign acquisitions differ from non-regional foreign
1The sector comprises 120 commercial banks with the top 10 banks accounting for 63% of the country’s
total banking system assets (Bank Indonesia, 2013).
2Under the ASEAN Banking Integration Framework (ABIF), banks based in the Association of South-
east Asian Nations (ASEAN) region - currently categorized as foreign banks in a neighboring country -
will be re-classified as Qualified ASEAN Banks (QABs) and be given greater market access across the
ten ASEAN countries. Initiated in 2007, ABIF is expected to be fully implemented by 2020.
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acquisitions in terms of the characteristics of the banks acquired and the performance and
risk exposure of the acquired banks post acquisisition?
Our work directly relates to the studies by Berger et al. (2005) on Argentina and
Lin and Zhang (2009) on China. It is our contention that the major types of bank
ownership are also forms of governance in developing countries. The prevalence of weak
legal infrastructures that often fail to provide adequate protection for investors causes
ownership to play a de facto crucial role in reducing managerial agency costs. This is
in contrast to conventional methods used by shareholders in developed nations to reduce
agency costs, such as board composition, voting rules or stakes held by managers.3
We contribute to the literature in at least three ways. First, we extend the approach
of Berger et al. (2005) and Lin and Zhang (2009), which jointly analyzes the static,
selection, and dynamic effects of the different types of ownership on bank performance,
by investigating how ownership also impacts on risk exposure. In our model, static effects
refer to differences in performance or risk exposure among banks that have not observed
any ownership change over the sample period. Selection effects refer to performance or
risk exposure differences among banks that have experienced some ownership change over
the sample period. In other words, selection effects measure the pre-ownership change
differences in performance or risk exposure between the banks selected for acquisition and
private banks that did not experience any change in ownership. Dynamic effects refer to
performance or risk exposure effects associated with domestic and foreign acquisitions.
Second, we distinguish between cross-border acquisitions carried out by regional foreign
investors from the Southeast and East Asian regions and those conducted by non-regional
foreign investors. A regional foreign acquisition is defined as an acquisition by an investor
3Berger et al. (2005) also argue that the objective of shareholder value maximization may not neces-
sarily apply to foreign and state owners. Foreign owners may be concerned with the value of the whole
international organization, rather than an individual bank in the foreign country, and state owners may
have social or political objectives. Governance in this context includes the effects of the goals of different
ownership types, as well as the ability of the owners to minimize managerial agency costs. Notwithstand-
ing, the unavailability and/or unreliability of governance-related variables, which is a common feature
for developing countries, is a limitation of our study. Therefore, we use ownership change as a proxy for
governance change - an alternative commonly used in the literature - to overcome this constraint.
4
whose country of origin is a Southeast Asian or East Asian country. Thus, regional foreign
acquisitions include but are not limited to acquisitions from investors originating from the
ASEAN countries. This allows us to draw important policy implications regarding the
potential impact on the Indonesian banking sector of the current trend in regional financial
integration. Third, this study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to specifically
investigate the effects of changes in bank ownership in Indonesia following the country’s
recent intensive spell of banking consolidation. Our sample consists of 60 commercial
banks over the period 2005 to 2012, representing approximately 75% of the Indonesian
banking sector in terms of total assets.
Our main results are as follows. State-owned banks tend to be less profitable and more
exposed to risk than private and foreign banks. Domestic investors tend to select the best
performers for acquisition. Moreover, domestic acquisition is associated with a decrease
in the efficiency of the acquired banks. Finally, regional foreign acquisition is associated
with performance gains while non-regional foreign acquisition is associated with reduced
exposure to risk.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview
of the banking system in Indonesia. Section 3 reviews the literature on the impact of
ownership on bank performance and risk with an emphasis on emerging markets. Section
4 describes our data and methodology. Empirical results are discussed in Section 5.
Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2 Review of the Indonesian banking sector
Prior to 1983 the Indonesian banking system was characterized by credit ceilings, interest
rates rate controls, and restrictions on bank branching, all of which hindered deposit
mobilization. State-owned banks (SOBs) were primarily used to channel loans to targeted
borrowers at relatively low interest rates.4 The deregulation of the banking sector was
4Under the directed subsidized credit schemes known as liquidity credit schemes, such loans were
subsequently eligible for refinancing from the central bank at subsidized rates.
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triggered by the fall in oil revenues in 1982. A first package of reforms was introduced in
June 1983 aimed at removing directed credit programs and lifting interest rate controls.
The reforms, however, did not abolish entry barriers, either among banks or between
banks and other financial institutions. In October 1988, an important policy package
opened up the banking sector to limited foreign competition and eased the requirements
for establishing new banks5. The 1992 banking law eventually allowed foreign investors to
acquire shares in publicly listed domestic banks although foreign shares were not permitted
to exceed 49% of total shareholding, and the government was required to retain majority
shareholding in any SOB whose shares were offered to the public. Deregulation led to the
rapid expansion of the banking sector with the total assets of commercial banks increasing
10-fold to IDR 715.2 trillion during the period 1988-1997, exceeding for the first time the
size of the countrys GDP (Chou and Lin, 2011).
The subsequent increase in competition between banks that resulted from banking
deregulation happened under a relatively weak regulatory and supervisory framework.
This, in turn, magnified the impact of the 1997 Asian financial crisis on the banking sector.
Restructuration involved closure, mergers, nationalization through the Indonesian Bank
Restructuring Agency (IBRA), and recapitalization with government funds. Amendments
to the 1992 banking law lifted the requirement that the government had to retain majority
ownership of SOBs; abolished regulations discriminating between domestic and foreign
joint-venture banks; and allowed foreign owners to acquire up to 100% of the shares in
existing banks (including SOBs). Later in the restructuring process, the government
started privatizing SOBs and divesting government shares of recapitalized private banks.
Since 2006, the government has focused on improving the competitiveness of the bank-
ing sector by reducing the number of banks through a process of consolidation. In 2006,
the Single Presence Policy (SPP) was introduced based upon the premise that any con-
trolling shareholder of a bank should be limited to owning only one banking operation in
5New domestic banks could be established, subject only to a small minimum capital requirement, and
foreign banks were allowed to set up joint ventures with existing domestic banking partners.
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Indonesia. A controlling shareholder of a bank is defined as either a party that holds 25%
or more shares with voting rights in a bank, or a party with direct or indirect control of a
bank even where it holds less than 25% of the shares. Under the policy, a shareholder is
prevented from owning controlling stakes in multiple banks. Bank owners with multiple
controlling stakes are required either to divest stakes, to establish a holding company,
or to merge banks. In December 2012, the central bank loosened the SPP to support
local banks being consolidated through M&As. Under the 2012 regulation, a controlling
shareholder is allowed to have a controlling share in more than one bank subject to the
proviso that one bank is a conventional bank and the other is a Sharia bank; or one of
the banks is a joint-venture bank. However, if these exceptions do not apply, the central
bank introduced incentives for banks contemplating a merger, including a temporary re-
laxation of the rules on minimum statutory reserve requirements. The central bank also
set policies to raise the capital adequacy of banks by raising the minimum Tier 1 capital
to IDR 100 billion for all commercial banks providing incentives for banks to merge as
part of their consolidation strategy.
Currently, foreign banks can establish a branch or a representative office, establish
a new bank in joint venture with local firms up to 99% foreign equity ownership, or
acquire up to 99% of total equity in domestic banks. A bank is classified as foreign if
the direct or total percentage of ownership from shareholders settled in foreign countries
is at least 50.01% of the total shares of the bank. In August 2015, the assets of foreign
and joint-venture banks stood at IDR 807 trillion, accounting for about 13.5% of the
country’s banking sector, according to the central bank data. In comparison, the assets
of state-owned banks amounted to IDR 2,160 trillion while the assets of private banks
amounted to IDR 2,510 trillion, accounting for 36% and 42% of the country’s banking
sector, respectively.
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3 Related literature
Bank ownership change typically occurs as a consequence of privatization, nationalization,
or M&As between private entities. In this paper we consider different types of ownership
as different forms of governance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1996;
Jensen, 1993; Berger et al., 2005; Lin and Zhang, 2009). Indeed, the effect of takeovers is
widely perceived as a critical corporate governance mechanism. Hence, we aim to capture
the effects of changes in governance (which are often difficult to observe due to the lack of
reliable governance data at the bank-level in emerging markets) on banks through changes
in ownership.
Calomiris and Karceski (2000) and Focarelli et al. (2002) are among early studies
that emphasize the importance of distinguishing between the short-term and long-term
effects of M&A on bank performance. Berger (1995) investigates the impact of M&A
on SMEs lending and highlights the importance of including long lags in the analysis
to capture the lagged effects of a M&A due to the time it often takes the acquirer to
restructure and reorganize the acquired firm. We take this into account in this paper by
considering not only the static effect of different types of ownership but also the dynamic
(long-term) effects of ownership change. Our work relates directly to the work of Berger
et al. (2005) on Argentina and Lin and Zhang (2009) on China. It differs from these
two studies, however, in that we also investigate the impact of ownership change on the
banks’ exposure to risk. Moreover, we distinguish between the effects of regional and
non-regional foreign ownership.
State-ownership is often regarded as a relatively inefficient form of ownership com-
pared to other forms of ownership. Proponents of this view point to observed inefficien-
cies, overstaffing, and high levels of nonperforming loans in SOBs as well as major dif-
ferences in objectives between state-owned and private banks (Sapienza, 2004; Claessens
and Van Horen, 2012; Shleifer, 1998). Profit maximization may not be the prime ob-
jective of SOBs as is the case with private banks. Furthermore, under state-ownership
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the agent may lack the incentives to exert effort towards profit maximization and/or it
may be more difficult and costly for the principal to exercise monitoring. In contrast,
private banks are typically less affected by political interference and better able to maxi-
mize profits, for instance by aligning the objectives of the principal and the agent using
incentives schemes and superior governance systems (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Some
studies, however, argue that externalities and monopoly power may distort the benefits
of private ownership. For instance, the concentration of ownership in the hand of large
private investors may lead to exploitation of other stakeholders’ rights due to the primary
focus on profit maximization (Sappington and Stiglitz, 1987; Laffont and Tirole, 1993).
The empirical evidence obtained from cross-country studies on the relative superiority
of one form of ownership over another typically yields contrasting results. The country’s
level of financial development (Lee et al., 2012); political factors (Micco et al., 2007); and
other country-specific factors (Angkinand and Wihlborg, 2010) appear to be important
determinants of bank performance and risk. Mian (2003) investigates the strengths and
weaknesses of the three main organizational designs (i.e. the different types of owner-
ship) and finds that private banks outperform SOBs in emerging markets.6 In another
cross-country study, Goddard et al. (2014) find that the cost efficiency of SOBs in Latin
American countries deteriorated during the 1990s, before improving during the 2000s until
the sub-prime crisis. In the same study, the profitability of SOBs is found to be inferior
to other types of ownership. Fries and Taci (2005) investigate the performance of 289
banks from 15 East European transition countries. They find that private banks are more
cost efficient than SOBs. Bonin et al. (2005a) analyze the effects of ownership on bank
efficiency using data from 11 transition countries for the period 1996-2000. Their analysis
reveals that SOBs are more efficient than de novo domestic private banks but inferior to
banks already privatized (supporting the argument that better banks tend to be priva-
tized first). Berger et al. (2005) and Delfino (2003) find similar evidence for Argentinan
banks. Haber (2005) show that SOBs are the worst performers among Mexican banks.
6The three organizational designs are state-owned, private-owned and foreign banks.
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Lin and Zhang (2009) and Berger et al. (2009) find that SOBs are the least profit efficient
banks in China. Chen (1998) and Mercan et al. (2003) report similar findings for Taiwan
and Turkey, respectively. In contrast, Sathye (2003) and Isik and Hassan (2003) find that
SOBs are more efficient than private banks in India and Turkey, respectively. Fethi et al.
(2011) find that SOBs in Egypt gained more from liberalization policies and, in general,
tend to be more productive compared to other types of banks. Shen and Lin (2012) find
that political interference tends to weaken the performance of SOBs in China compared
to other banks. Dong et al. (2014) also unveil discrepancies in risk taking among different
types of bank ownership in China. They find the Chinese banks that are controlled by
the government tend to take more risks than those controlled by private investors. They
attribute this finding to political intervention and a lack of incentives to follow prudent
bank management practices.
Many studies explore the static effect of domestic versus foreign ownership on bank
performance and find that foreign banks are the most profitable (Berger et al., 2004; Isik
and Hassan, 2003). Naaborg and Lensink (2008), however, find evidence of a negative
relationship between foreign ownership and bank profitability that suggests a home-field
advantage for domestic banks. Claessens and Van Horen (2012) show that foreign banks
perform better than domestic banks when (i) the foreign acquirer is from a high-income
country; (ii) the regulation in the host country is relatively weak; (iii) the foreign acquirer’s
country of origin has the same language and similar regulation as the host country; (v)
the acquirer is large and possesses a high market share. Jia (2009) finds that Chinese
joint-equity banks behave more prudently with respect to their lending. Likewise, there
is empirical evidence that foreign ownership is associated with lower overdue loans and
higher regulatory capital in Taiwan (Chou and Lin, 2011). Iannotta et al. (2007) investi-
gate 181 large banks from 15 European countries over the 1999-2004 period to evaluate
the impact of ownership type and ownership concentration on performance. They find
that mutual banks and SOBs have lower profitability compared to private banks. They
also exhibit poorer loan quality and a higher risk of insolvency. Cornett et al. (2010) ex-
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amine the performance and behavior towards risk of SOBs in 16 Far East countries over
the period 1989-2004. SOBs are found to be less profitable and exposed to higher credit
risk than private banks prior to the Asian financial crisis. The performance of SOBS is
found to further deteriorate during the crisis and to converge towards the performance of
private banks afterwards.
The dynamic effect of acquisition by domestic or foreign investors on bank performance
and risk is central to our analysis. There is a general consensus in the literature that a
change to private (domestic) or foreign ownership leads to performance improvement
and/or a reduction in the risk exposure of banks. Megginson et al. (1994) and Megginson
and Netter (2001) provide evidence of gains achieved through privatization. Boubakri
et al. (2005) find that in developing countries privatization yields significant improvements
in bank efficiency in the long run. Berger et al. (2005) find that the performance of
SOBs in Argentina was particularly poor before privatization but improved dramatically
afterwards. Privatization itself is not sufficient to ensure greater efficiency and both the
method and timing of privatization are relevant to performance (Bonin et al., 2005a,b).
Mohsni and Otchere (2014) find that privatized banks experience a significant decrease in
risk after privatization but continue to exhibit higher risk than their rivals. Their results
show that the risk-taking behavior of newly privatized banks is influenced by the country’s
level of development as well as its degree of political risk.
Foreign acquisition is often found to be associated with efficiency gains (see inter
alia Dages et al., 2000; Claessens et al., 2001; Bonin et al., 2005a). Berger et al. (2009)
show that minority foreign ownership is associated with significantly improved efficiency
in Chinese banks. Ariff and Luc (2008) and Jiang et al. (2009) and Jiang et al. (2013)
show that joint-equity ownership in China also tends to be associated with profitability
and efficiency gains and offers long-term benefits. These findings are often attributed to
foreign banks having greater access to capital, being better able to diversify risks, possess-
ing technological superiority or being more innovative, for instance by introducing new
managerial skills and production processes. Berger et al. (2003) and Buch and DeLong
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(2004), however, find that foreign banks are at a disadvantage when it comes to accessing
qualitative information regarding local conditions. Lensink et al. (2008) show that effi-
ciency gains depend on the institutional quality of the host country and on institutional
differences between the home and host country. Lee et al. (2012) find that a lower level of
economic development of the host country enhances the positive effects of foreign owner-
ship on the banks income, profit and cost. The mode of foreign entry appears to matter.
Foreign Greenfield banks are characterized by superior cost efficiency, compared to foreign
and domestic banks (Poghosyan and Poghosyan, 2010; Havrylchyk, 2006). Other studies
explore the relationship between ownership and the selection of banks for acquisition.
Poghosyan and Poghosyan (2010), for instance, find that foreign banks target relatively
large and efficient banks when the country’s institutions are weak.
The literature on the performance and risk of Indonesian banks reveals that SOBs tend
to outperform foreign banks. Investigating Indonesian banks over the period 2003-2009,
Hadad et al. (2011a) examine the relationship between bank efficiency and stock market
performance. Their study uses a Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)-based approach and
finds that foreign banks tend to be less efficient compared to their domestic counterparts.
Hadad et al. (2011b) investigate productivity changes and risk management in Indone-
sian banks over the same period. Their study employs the non-parametric DEA-based
Malmquist index to estimate the productivity index and its components. They find that
SOBs exhibit the highest degree of risk. However, listed Islamic banks outperform non-
listed and conventional banks in terms of risk management. Hadad et al. (2012) find that
SOBs are the most efficient banks in their sample but that regional SOBs are the least
efficient ones. Regarding scale efficiency Hadad et al. (2013) confirms that SOBs have
above average scale efficiency scores. They argue that M&As in this group of banks could
result in cost saving (between US$ 475 million to US$ 1.8 billion).
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4 Methodology and Data
4.1 Sample and observations
We obtain our data from three sources: financial data on individual banks from the
Bankscope database (Bureau Van Dijk); data on M&A transactions from the Zephyr
database (Bureau Van Dijk); data on industry aggregates from Bank Indonesia’s annual
reports. Our original sample obtained from Bankscope comprised 94 Indonesian banks
categorized as commercial banks. We filtered out banks for which the data necessary to
estimate cost and profit functions was not available for all years over the period 2005-2012.
This reduced the sample to 60 banks. This final sample includes 64% of all the Indonesian
banks classified as commercial banks in Bankscope, representing approximately 75% of
the Indonesian banking sector in terms of total assets. We then matched the data obtained
from Bankscope using the unique BvD ID of each bank with the data obtained from the
Zephyr database to identify those banks involved in M&A transactions. Our second stage
analysis involves an unbalanced panel because some banks have missing observations for
the variables involved. Table 1 shows the distribution of the observations. We consider
completed and confirmed-completed M&A transactions that occurred between 01/01/2004
and 31/12/2011. This enables us to analyze the dynamic effects of any transaction that
occurred over the period 2005-2012. There were originally 39 M&A transactions that
occurred during this period. However, we restrict our analysis to 20 transactions out
of these 39 transactions based on the following criteria. We only consider a transaction
if it leads to a majority-controlling stake in the acquired bank. We define a majority-
controlling stake as a stake greater or equal to 50.01% of the target banks total shares.
We exclude any transaction that occurred as a top-up of an original majority stake. We
further exclude any multiple-tranche transactions involving the same banks occurring
within a one-year period (where the acquirer buys multiple shareholding tranches of the
target bank in a given year). Hence, we only consider the 20 transactions that brought
the acquirers stakes to or above controlling stakes in the acquired banks. Table 2 provides
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a summary of these transactions.
4.2 Model
In order to jointly analyze static, selection and dynamic effects on bank performance and
risk we use the model proposed by Berger et al. (2005) in Equation (1). We replace θit, the
performance measure, by σit, the proxy for risk in equation 2 to also investigate ownership
effects on bank risk.
θit = α +X
′
itβ + Z
′
itγ +D
′
itζ +C
′
itλ+ εit (1)
σit = α +X
′
itβ + Z
′
itγ +D
′
itζ +C
′
itλ+ εit (2)
where
θit is a measure of performance
σit is a meaure of exposure to risk
X′it is a vector of static ownership indicators
Z′it is a vector of selection ownership indicators
D′it is a vector of dynamic ownership indicators
C′it is a vector of control variables
and α, β, γ, ζ, and λ are parameters to be estimated by the models. See Table A.1 in
Appendix A for a detailed description of the variables. In all the models we account for
year fixed effects controlling for general macroeconomic conditions.
4.3 Endogenous variables
To obtain bank-specific relative performance measures we apply parametric frontier tech-
niques to compute both cost and profit efficiency scores for our sample of commercial
banks. A key advantage of parametric methods is that unlike deterministic methods (like
DEA) they allow for the specification of a stochastic term thus making the estimates
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less exposed to the influence of random events and measurement errors (Kumbhakar and
Lovell, 2003). We use the approach suggested by Battese and Coelli (1995) to obtain the
cost and profit efficiency scores. More specifically, the cost frontier is specified as:
lnCit = c(qit, wit, t : β) + (ln vit + ln uit) (3)
i = 1, ...,N and t = 1, ...,T
where lnCit is the total cost of bank i at time t, qit is a vector of outputs, wit is a set
of input prices, and t is a time trend that measures disembodied technical progress. β is
a vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. The error term has two components:
uit and vit. The term vit is the independent and identically distributed random error,
assumed to be distributed as a N(0, σ2vi) and to be independent of uit. The inefficiency
component uit is a non-negative random variable assumed to account for the banks cost
inefficiency and to be independently distributed with truncation at zero. The translog
cost function is presented in Equation (B.1) in Appendix B. The cost efficiency score of
a bank is defined as the ratio between the actual level of costs and the minimum level of
costs given the cost frontier (see Equation (B.2) in Appendix B). The definitions of the
key variables in the cost frontier are standard and can be found in the literature on bank
performance (see for example Berger et al., 2005; Bikker and Bos, 2008; Duygun et al.,
2013; Shaban et al., 2014). Costs are the total operating costs i.e. the sum of interest
expenses, salaries and employee benefits and other operating costs. Outputs in the vector
qit are loans (q1) and securities investments (q2). The loans variable is calculated as the
difference between the gross loans and the reserves allocated for non-performing loans.
We use three input prices in the vector wit. These are: (a) the cost of capital (w1)
calculated by dividing interest expenses by total deposits, (b) the cost of physical capital
(w2) calculated by dividing overhead expenses other than personnel expenses by the book
value of fixed assets and (c) the cost of labor (w3) calculated by dividing the personnel
expenses by the number of employees. We then proceed by normalizing the dependent
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variable and all the input prices to ensure linear homogeneity. Finally, following Berger
and Mester (1997), Duygun et al. (2013) and Shaban et al. (2014), we control for the level
of equity as a quasi-fixed input to control for differences in risk preferences.
To obtain the bank’s relative profit efficiency we estimate an alternative profit frontier
proposed by Berger and Mester (1997). The alternative profit frontier assumes that banks
take the output quantities and the input prices as given and maximize profits by adjusting
output prices and input quantities. The alternative profit frontiers may be preferable to
standard profit frontiers when there are differences in the quality of the banking outputs
and output markets are not competitive.
ln Pit = p(qit, wit, t : β) + (ln vit − ln uit) (4)
i = 1, ...,N and t = 1, ...,T
where ln Pit in Equation (4) is the profit before tax (PBT) for bank i at time t and
qit, wit, t are the same as in Equation (3) above.
7 β is a vector of unknown parameters
to be estimated. The error term has two components: uit and vit. The term vit is the
independent and identically distributed random error, assumed to be distributed as a
N(0, σ2vi) and to be independent of uit. The inefficiency component (uit) is a non-negative
random variable and enter the equation with negative sign, hence inefficiency reduces
profit. The alternative profit frontier does not need to be homogenous of degree one,
we do not divide the profits before tax by one of the inputs price. The specification of
the translog profit function and the relative measure of profit efficiency is in Appendix
B, Equations (B.3) and (B.4) respectively. Table 3 provides descriptive statistics on the
basic variables used in both the profit and cost efficiency estimations.
Once we have generated cost efficiency score (CE score) and profit efficiency score
(PE score) variables for each bank from the frontier models, we construct cost efficiency
7We overcome the presence of negative profits (losses) in some of the banks in our sample by trans-
forming the dependent variable Pit using the following procedure Pit = Pit + |(P)min| where (P)min is
the minimum absolute value of PBT over all banks in the sample.
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rank (CE rank) and profit efficiency rank (PE rank) variables by ranking efficiency scores
across all the banks in our sample. This is because efficiency ranks may be more accurate
indicators of the quality of the management of the institution than efficiency scores (Berger
et al., 2005). We rank efficiency scores as follows. First, we rank banks according to
their efficiency scores year-by-year. Second, for each year the bank that has the highest
efficiency score is ranked 1 and the bank with the lowest efficiency score is ranked 60.
Consequently, we obtain a total of four relative performance indicators to be used in
our second stage analysis. We estimate censored Tobit regressions when our dependent
variables are CE rank and PE rank; otherwise, we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS).
A negative (positive) coefficient associated to a given explanatory variable in the cost or
profit efficiency rank regression implies that an increase in this variable is associated with
a higher (lower) efficiency rank. In addition, we also consider standard financial ratios
often used to measure profit and cost performance: net interest margin (NIM); return on
average assets (ROA); return on average equity (ROE); total cost to total revenue (TCTR)
and cost-income ratio (CIR). It can be argued that these ratios are less appealing than
cost and profit efficiency scores and ranks (Berger et al., 2005). Importantly, we also
analyze the impact of ownership change on the banks exposure to risk by considering the
following measures: equity to total assets (ETA); core equity capital to total risk-weighted
assets (TIER1); net charge offs to average loans (NCO); non-performing loans to total
loans (NPL) and liquid assets to total assets (LATA).
4.4 Exogenous variables
The key exogenous variables in Equations (1) and (2) are the static, selection, and dynamic
ownership indicators. For our static indicators we construct dummies indicating no change
in ownership over the sample period: a dummy that equals 1 for a static foreign bank
and 0 otherwise (FB); a dummy that equals 1 for a static private bank and 0 otherwise
(PB); a dummy that equals 1 for a static state-owned bank and 0 otherwise (SOB).
We use the ultimate ownership feature of the Bureau van Dijk Bankscope database to
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construct the above dummies. This enables us to classify banks operating in Indonesia
as foreign, private, or state-owned. The ultimate owner is a single shareholder or a group
of shareholders with a direct or total percentage of ownership of at least 50.01% of the
total shares of the bank. For example, if the Indonesian banks ultimate owner is a private
Indonesian owner then the bank is classified as private. If the banks ultimate owner is
the Indonesian government then the bank is classified as state-owned.
In order to construct selection and dynamic ownership indicators, we track changes in
ultimate ownership following acquisitions using the Bureau van Dijk Zephyr database. For
our selection indicators, we construct dummies indicating a change in ownership over the
sample period: a dummy that equals 1 if the bank underwent a domestic acquisition and 0
otherwise (DA-S); a dummy that equals 1 if the bank underwent a non-regional/regional
foreign acquisition and 0 otherwise (FA-S/RA-S). For our dynamic indicators we con-
struct dummies for the years following a change in ownership (t+1): a dynamic domestic
acquisition dummy (DA-D); a dynamic non-regional/regional foreign acquisition dummy
(FA-D/RA-D).
We define a regional foreign acquisition as an acquisition by an investor whose country
of origin is a Southeast Asian or East Asian country. For example, the ultimate owner
of Bank ICBC Indonesia (established in 1989 as Bank Halim Indonesia) was Indonesian
until 2007. In 2007, Industrial & Commercial Bank of China acquired the bank and the
ultimate owner of Bank ICBC Indonesia became Chinese. Hence, this bank experienced
a change in ownership from private to regional foreign in 2007.
We limit any potential endogeneity bias that may arise as a result of foreign banks
selecting banks with inherently different characteristics by including bank specific control
variables. Theese control variables comprise a dummy that equals 1 for a publicly traded
bank and 0 otherwise (LISTED) and a dummy controlling for the activity of the acquiring
investor, which equals 1 if the acquirers main business is banking and 0 otherwise (BUSI-
NESS). Moreover, we include the natural logarithm of lagged total assets (SIZE) and the
lagged market share in terms of total assets (SHARE) to help account for differences in
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bank size and market power. Lastly, we include year fixed effects in the regressions to
control for general macroeconomic conditions.
5 Empirical results
The aim of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on the effect of ownership on bank
performance and risk exposure. As discussed in the previous section, in line with Berger
et al. (2005) and Lin and Zhang (2009) we consider static, selection, and dynamic effects.
We first generate robust relative performance indicators of cost and profit efficiency scores
driven from the estimation of cost and alternative profit functions, respectively. In the
second stage of our analysis we estimate two sets of models, where dependent variables are
either performance or risk exposure indicators. We employ the Tobit censored regression
model where we use CE rank or PE rank as the dependent variable, and OLS otherwise.
We first introduce a brief discussion on the descriptive statistics of the variables used
in the regressions and then proceed in the following sub-section to discussing our findings.
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on the variables used in the estimations based
on Equations (1) and (2). The table shows that the average cost efficiency score in our
sample is 0.95 with a 0.04 standard deviation, implying limited disparities in terms of cost
efficiency among our sample of Indonesian banks. The standard deviation of the profit
efficiency score, however, is slightly higher (0.11) with an average profit efficiency score
of 0.45. The accounting based profitability indicators show a healthy profitable banking
sector with average NIM, ROA and ROE of 5.32%, 1.65%, and 11.56%, respectively.
There is significant variation observed in the risk exposure indicators, with average ETA
and Tier 1 ratios approaching 15% and 12%, respectively.
5.1 Static effects
In this section we discuss our findings on the static effect of different types of ownership.
Table 5 reports the results of the performance model using the efficiency scores and ranks
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obtained from the frontier models. Furthermore, we report the results where profitability
and efficiency ratios are dependent variables in Equation (1). The coefficients on the FB
and SOB variables capture the static effects on the performance of banks of continuous
foreign and state ownership relative to private ownership (i.e. no change in ownership
over the entire sample period). In terms of the static effect of ownership on cost efficiency
performance, the significant and positive sign of the coefficient on FB in the CE rank
regression indicates that foreign ownership is associated with a lower cost efficiency rank
than private (domestic) ownership, while the coefficient on FB in the CE score regression
is not statistically significant. The coefficient on SOB in the CE rank regression is in-
significant but the positive and statistically significant coefficient on SOB in the CE score
regression suggests that state ownership may be somewhat associated with higher cost
efficiency. This finding appears to be in line with Hadad et al. (2012). The results also
indicate that foreign banks tend to underperform private banks but outperform SOBs, as
shown by the sign and significance of the coefficients on FB and SOB in the PE rank re-
gression as well as in the PE score regression. The finding that foreign banks trail private
banks in terms of both cost and profit efficiency is broadly consistent with the results of
Hadad et al. (2011a).
The results obtained with accounting indicators as performance measures show that
foreign banks tend to be more successful in generating higher return on equity (ROE) and
tend to have a lower cost-to-income ratio (CIR) in relation to private banks and SOBs.8
The negative and statistically significant coefficient in the CIR regression suggests that
foreign banks tend to be more efficient in managing their overhead costs relative to income.
In contrast, SOBs appear to be less efficient in managing their overhead costs as shown
by the positive and statistically significant coefficient on SOB in the CIR regression.
The coefficients on FB (SOB) in the total costs to total revenues (TCTR) regression are
positive (negative) and statistically significant suggesting that foreign (state-owned) banks
8CIR shows the extent to which operating expenses (i.e. overheads) absorb operating revenues. The
lower this ratio the more efficient the bank is in managing overhead costs relative to income.
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are relatively inefficient (efficient) at managing their total costs to revenues compared to
private banks.9 The positive and significant coefficient on SOB in the net interest margin
(NIM) regression indicates that Indonesian SOBs enjoy a relatively healthy NIM compared
to other banks in the sector. There are a number of possible explanations for this finding.
SOBs in Indonesia could be charging higher interest rates to compensate for contracting
relatively riskier loans than other banks. SOBs in Indonesia also have abundant access to
deposits given their enormous branch network in the country and the implicit guarantees
they provide of the safety of these deposits. The negative (positive) significant coefficient
on SOB in the TCTR (CIR) regression suggest that that SOBs have higher overheads but
lower interest expenses compared to their counterparts. Overall, our findings are for the
most part consistent with the common finding of the empirical literature that SOBs are
typically less efficient than private and foreign banks as they do not necessarily pursue
profit maximization and their lending activity may be politically motivated (Sapienza,
2004; Shen and Lin, 2012). The CIR regression indicates that SOBs are burdened with
higher levels of operating cost compared to private and foreign banks. One possible
explanation is overstaffing, a common burden that is often borne by state-owned banks
to help the government reduce unemployment.
One key contribution of this study is to further investigate the effect of ownership on
the banks’ attitude towards risk. Table 6 reports the results of the regression models that
used risk indicators as dependent variables (Equation (2)). The equity to total assets
(ETA) regression shows that SOBs tend to be less capitalized compared to private banks.
The coefficient on FB in the net charge-offs to average loans (NCO) regression is positive
and statistically significant.10 In the first instance, one may naively interpret this result
as suggesting that foreign ownership is associated with a relatively greater amount of
9TCTR measures the bank’s efficiency in managing total costs (i.e. overheads plus interest expenses
and other expenses) relative to total revenues, which include interest and non-interest income.
10Banks regularly charge-off bad debt or poor credit quality loans and remove them from the books.
This process may occur on a monthly or quarterly basis. If, at a later date, part of the debt is actually
repaid, the net charge-offs can be calculated as the difference between the gross charge-offs and the
repaid debt. Thus, a negative value for net charge-offs indicates that recoveries are greater than charge-
offs during a particular accounting period.
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poor credit quality loans. However, the non-performing loans (NPL) regression provides
evidence that foreign and state-owned banks have a lower proportion of NPLs relative to
private (domestic) banks. One possible explanation is that foreign banks are more active
in charging-off bad loans compared to domestic banks. This is not inconsistent with the
view that foreign banks typically possess relatively superior loan screening and monitoring
technologies.
5.2 Selection effects
In this section we present our findings on the selection effect of ownership on bank per-
formance and risk-exposure. Through each selection indicator we aim to capture the
significant differences in the characteristics of the banks selected for acquisition.
As shown in Table 5 the CE rank and PE rank regressions yield negative and signifi-
cant coefficients for DA-S of -11.57 and -12.18 respectively. In line with these results, the
CE and PE score regressions yield positive and significant coefficients for DA-S. The DA-
S coefficient in the NIM regression is negative and statistically significant implying that
banks selected for M&A by domestic investors tend to have a lower NIM. The same coeffi-
cient is positive and statistically significant in the ROA and TCTR regressions, suggesting
that domestic investors tend to prefer banks with a higher return on assets regardless of
cost efficiency. It is worth noting that these findings are not directly comparable to those
obtained using CE score or CE rank as the dependent variable since score and rank are
frontier-based measures. Notwithstanding, the DA-S coefficient in the ROA regression is
is line with the DA-S coefficient in the PE score and rank regressions. The FA-S variable
has positive and significant coefficients in the CE and PE rank regressions as well as a
negative and significant coefficient in the PE score regression. The FA-S coefficient is,
however, insignificant in the CE score regression. This suggests that, compared to their
peers, domestic investors are more careful in selecting targets characterized by relatively
higher levels of profit and cost efficiency. Domestic investors are often banks that aim to
benefit from the positive synergies generated through acquisitions. They are likely to be
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more knowledgeable than foreign acquirers about the banks already operating domesti-
cally. Banks with lower TCTR also appear to be more attractive to non-regional foreign
investors as shown by the negative and significant coefficient on FA-S in the TCTR re-
gression. One possible explanation for these results is that the primary objective of non-
regional foreign investors may be to penetrate the host country’s market and increase
market power as opposed to selecting banks that already exhibit superior performance in
the industry.
Turning to the results on exposure to risk, Table 6 shows that domestic investors
appear to select highly capitalized banks, with lower proportions of non-performing loans
as shown by the significant positive and negative coefficients on DA-S in the ETA and
NPL regressions, respectively. However, domestic investors do not appear to attach as
much importance to the levels of NCO in the acquired banks as shown by the positive
and significant coefficient on DA-S in the NCO regression. The DA-S coefficients in both
the TIER1 and LATA regressions are negative and statistically significant implying that
banks selected for M&A by domestic investors tend to have lower capital adequacy ratio
and lower liquidity levels, respectively. In contrast, the FA-S coefficient in the LATA
regression is positive and statistically significant. Overall, domestic investors in Indonesia
seem to target highly capitalized banks with somewhat less problematic loan portfolios.
As with the selection of banks in terms of performance, acquisition synergies may be a
significant driver of acquisitions for domestic investors when assessing their targets risk
exposure. In contrast, non-regional foreign investors seem to attach less importance to
their targets’ capitalization and more to their level of NCOs. These findings are intuitive.
Non-regional foreign investors in Indonesia are typically large international banks with
greater access to capital compared to domestic investors. As a consequence, they may be
more concerned with the quality of the bank’s loan portfolio than with its capitalization.
In contrast, domestic investors may be keen to acquire well-capitalized banks, either
because it allows them to improve the overall capitalization of the new entity (especially
for leveraged pay-outs) or hedge against risky decisions taken in the future.
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5.3 Dynamic effects
By dynamic effects we mean the post-acquisition long-term effects of ownership change on
an acquired bank. As shown in Table 5, the CE score regression results yield negative and
statistically significant coefficients on DA-D (-0.011) and FA-D (-0.016) implying that both
domestic and foreign ownership change led to deterioration in cost efficiency. This decline,
however, is marginally smaller with domestic acquisitions. The coefficients on DA-D and
FA-D in the CE rank regressions provide further supporting evidence of these effects.
Domestic acquisition is associated with higher CIR and non-regional foreign acquisition
is associated with higher TCTR. The coefficient on FA-D in the PE score regression is
positive and significant indicating that non-regional foreign acquisition is associated with
profit efficiency gains. In contrast, the coefficients on DA-D in the PE score and PE rank
regressions show deterioration in profit efficiency following domestic acquisition. Banks
acquired by domestic investors also suffered a decline in ROA and ROE, and an increase
in the cost-to-income ratio. The results show, however, some possible performance gains
in terms of net interest margin and total costs to total revenues. Taken together, these
results suggest at first that both domestic and non-regional foreign acquisition has a strong
but mostly negative impact on cost efficiency.
Turning to our result on the dynamic effect of ownership change on risk exposure,
Table 6 shows that non-regional foreign acquisition is associated with an increase in ETA.
This suggests a reduction in the risk-exposure of banks acquired by non-regional foreign
investors. Non-regional foreign acquisition is also associated with an increase in NCOs, as
one would expect if bad loans are more actively charged-off. The results also show that
non-regional foreign acquisition is associated with a decrease in the ratio of liquid assets
to total assets. This finding can be explained by the fact that Indonesian subsidiaries
of international banks can access liquidity in both Indonesia and abroad, which makes
them less concerned about liquidity shocks, reducing in turn the volumes of liquid assets
they hold compared to other banks in the sector.11 The coefficients on DA-D in the
11Subsidiaries of international banks, however, would increase their volumes of liquid assets in the
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ETA and TIER 1 regressions shed light on the dynamic effect of domestic acquisition on
capital. Domestic acquisition is simultaneously associated with a decrease in shareholder
equity and an increase in the Tier 1 capital ratio. These two findings are not necessarily
contradictory, especially if the increase in the Tier 1 capital ratio is mainly driven by
growth in relatively safe assets, such as cash or government securities.
5.4 Selection and dynamic effects of regional foreign acquisitions
Our bank performance results controlling for regional foreign acquisitions are reported in
Table 7. Starting with the selection effect of regional foreign acquisitions, the coefficient
on RA-S is positive and statistically significant in the CE rank regression. Like non-
regional foreign investors, regional investors tend to target the relatively less efficient
banks. This finding is further supported by the negative and significant coefficient on
RA-S in the CE and PE score regressions. This suggests that the selection behavior
of regional investors could be driven by the same unobservable factors (e.g. increasing
market power as the primary objective) that influence the selection behavior of non-
regional foreign investors. The RA-S coefficients in both the ROE and CIR regressions
are negative and statistically significant implying that banks selected for M&A by regional
foreign investors tend to have a lower return on equity but are relatively more efficient at
managing their overhead costs. Table 8 reports our bank risk exposure results controlling
for acquisitions by regional foreign investors. Focussing on the selection effect of regional
foreign acquisitions, regional foreign investors appear to select banks with relatively less
risky portfolios. The coefficient on RA-S in the NPL regression is negative and statistically
significant (-1.163).
Turning to the dynamic effect of foreign acquisition from regional foreign investors on
bank performance, Table 7 shows that banks acquired by regional foreign investors expe-
rienced cost and profit efficiency gains as indicated by the significant coefficient on RA-D
in the CE score, CE rank, PE score, and PE rank regressions. Banks acquired by regional
presence of an aggregate liquidity shortage in the host country (Freixas and Holthausen, 2005).
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foreign investors also improved their net interest margin despite the fact that their cost-to-
income ratios increased. The results suggest that foreign acquisitions by regional investors
are generally associated with performance gains unlike non-regional foreign acquisitions,
which yield mixed performance results (as shown in Table 6). Regional foreign investors,
unlike non-regional foreign investors, may have superior knowledge of local conditions,
which in turn enables them to turn low performers around. These results are also in
sharp contrast with the finding that banks acquired by domestic investors tend to suffer
a post-acquisition decline in performance as the coefficients on DA-D reported in Table 7
indicate. On possible explanation is that domestic investors in Indonesia are often private
banks sharing many of the characteristics of the banks they acquire (e.g. limited access
to capital, inferior technology, poor managerial skills).
Controlling for regional foreign acquisitions yields noticeably different results on the
dynamic effect of foreign acquisition on risk exposure, as shown in Table 8. The co-
efficient on the regional foreign acquisition dynamic indicator is insignificant across all
the regressions, which suggesst that regional foreign acquisition has no dynamic effect
on the acquired banks’ exposure to risk. This contrasts with our results for non-regional
foreign acquisitions (as shown in Table 6). Hence, our findings suggest significant dif-
ferences between the long-term impact on bank risk of regional and non-regional foreign
acquisitions.
5.5 Other effects
With respect to our control variables, larger banks (captured by the dummy variable
SIZE) are generally associated with greater cost and profit efficiency (statistically signif-
icant higher PE efficiency scores, higher cost efficiency ranks, higher ROE, lower TCTR
and lower CIR). This suggests the existence of economies of scale when operating on
a larger scale. These banks, however, display mixed risk-exposure results compared to
smaller banks (statistically significant lower capitalization, higher NCOs and lower liq-
uidity). Banks that are publicly listed (captured by the dummy variable LISTED) are
26
associated with lower profit efficiency (lower profit ranks, lower NIM, lower ROA, lower
ROE) but generally greater cost efficiency (statistically significant higher cost efficiency
scores, higher cost efficiency ranks, lower TCTR). These banks are not, by and large,
different in terms of risk-exposure from other acquired banks, although they tend to have
lower ratios of ETA and LATA. Banks with a high market share (captured by the dummy
variable SHARE) tend to be more efficient and profitable (as shown in all the regressions
where this coefficient is statistically significant) but have mixed risk-exposure results (they
tend to be more capitalized and have higher liquidity levels but hold a greater proportion
of NPLs). Banks acquired by investors whose main line of business is banking (captured
by the dummy variable BUSINESS) are not generally different in terms of performance or
risk-exposure from other acquired banks. The BUSINESS coefficient is only statistically
significant in the CE score and NCO regressions, which suggests that these banks tend to
be relatively more cost efficient and have lower net charge-offs.
6 Conclusion
In this study we investigate the effect of ownership change on performance and risk-
exposure of Indonesian banks. We consider the static, selection and dynamic effects of
the major types of ownership jointly in the same model. Since we investigate banks in
a developing economy with relatively weak investor protection, we construe ownership
change as a proxy for governance change. Importantly, we disentangle the selection and
dynamic effects of acquisition by regional foreign investors from Southeast and East Asian
countries from those of acquisition by non-regional foreign investors. Our main findings
are as follows. Private banks in Indonesia are the best performers in terms of cost and
profit efficiency. Foreign banks, however, appear to be relatively more prudent, to the
extent that foreign ownership is significantly associated with a lower proportion of non-
performing loans. Domestic investors tend to select the best performing banks. Domestic
acquisition, however, is associated with a decline in performance of the acquired banks.
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Non-regional foreign acquisition is associated with a reduction in the proportion of non-
performing loans and improvements in the acquired bank’s capitalization. Regional foreign
acquisition is associated with significant performance gains.
Taken together, our results have important policy implications for the countrys au-
thorities. The ASEAN Banking Integration Framework, endorsed by ASEAN Central
Bank Governors in December 2014, represents a critical milestone for ASEAN countries
in achieving greater financial integration. The immediate objective of ABIF is to achieve
a more highly integrated banking market by 2020. Allowing banks to operate across
borders enables them to take advantage of economies of scale to increase profit and cost
efficiency. As barriers to entry fall, however, stronger competition from ASEAN banks
as well as other banks in the region also pushes Indonesian banks to merge as they look
to strengthen their domestic position and better compete against their regional rivals.
Thus, understanding the effects of M&As on the Indonesian banking market is key to
assessing the potential gains from closer integration as well as the new risks it can give
rise to. Heightened competition should spur Indonesia’s policy makers to take more steps
to improve the efficiency of SOBs, which presently trails that of other banks as suggested
by this paper’s findings. Our results also imply that the country should strengthen its
regulatory and supervisory framework to prevent banks acquired by domestic investors
from taking excessive risks. Regulators should encourage such banks to increase their cap-
ital and improve the monitoring of their loan portfolios. As our analysis demonstrates,
domestic acquisition is generally associated with a decline in performance. Policy makers
may therefore wish to prioritize domestic interests by protecting the country’s domestic
market until its banks can compete domestically with their rivals in Southeast and East
Asia. Indonesia may risk losing its market to regional foreign banks should it support
the acceleration of ABIF before its domestic banks have attained the requisite level of
competitiveness.
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APPENDIX A
Table A.1: Variable definitions
Variable name Definition
Endogenous variables
CE SCORE Cost efficiency score
CE RANK Cost efficiency rank
PE SCORE Profit efficiency score
PE RANK Profit efficiency rank
NIM Net interest margin
ROA Return on average asset
ROE Return on average equity
TCTR Total costs to total revenues
CIR Cost income ratio
ETA Equity to total assets
TIER1 Tier 1 capital ratio (ratio of core equity capital to total risk-weighted assets)
NCO Net charge offs to average loans
NPL Non-performing loans to total loans
LATA Liquid assets to total assets
Static Ownership Indicators
PB
Dummy indicating a private bank that underwent no changes in ownership over the entire 2005-2012 interval. Equals 1 or 0 for all
years for a bank. Excluded from regressions as the base case when all the other static and selection ownership indicators are
included.
FB
Dummy indicating a foreign bank that underwent no changes in ownership over the entire 2005-2012 interval. Equals 1 or 0 for all
years for a bank.
SOB Dummy indicating a state-owned bank that underwent no changes in ownership over the entire 2005-2012 interval. Equals 1 or 0
for all years for a bank.
Selection Ownership Indicators
DA-S
Dummy indicating a bank that underwent a domestic acquisition over the entire 2005-2012 interval. Equals 1 or 0 for all years for
a bank. If the bank went through a foreign acquisition, the variable is set to 0, as a foreign acquisition is considered to be the
dominating event.
FA-S/RA-S
Dummy indicating a bank that underwent at least one foreign/regional acquisition over the entire 2005-2012 interval. Equals 1 or
0 for all years for a bank.
Dynamic Ownership Indicators
DA-D
Dummy indicating the years following a bank’s domestic acquisition. Equals 0 prior to the bank’s acquisition and 1 starting in the
year following the domestic acquisition (t+1). It also equals 0 for all years for banks that did not undergo a domestic acquisition.
FA-D/RA-D
Dummy indicating the years following a bank’s foreign/regional acquisition. Equals 0 prior to the bank’s acquisition and 1
starting in the year following the foreign/regional acquisition (t+1). It also equals 0 for all years for banks that did not undergo a
foreign/regional acquisition.
Control variables
LISTED Dummy indicating a publicly traded bank.
BUSINESS Dummy indicating the business of the acquiring investor. Equals 1 if the acquirer’s main business is banking.
SIZE Log of total assets in t-1 for each bank.
SHARE Market share in t-1 for each bank.
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APPENDIX B
1. The multi-output translog functional form for the cost frontier (3) is as follows:
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2. We use the parameter estimates from the cost function in equation (??) to obtain a bank-
specific measure of relative cost efficiency as follows:
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3. The translog profit function takes the following form:
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4. We use the parameter estimates from the profit function in equation (??) to obtain a
bank-specific measure of relative profit efficiency as follows:
ProfitEff
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Table 1: Distribution of observations by ownership type
Year Private banks State-owned banks Foreign banks Regional foreign banks Non-regional foreign banks Total
2005 19 4 21 15 6 44
2006 20 4 22 17 5 46
2007 22 4 24 19 5 50
2008 24 4 24 18 6 52
2009 30 4 22 15 7 56
2010 34 4 22 15 7 60
2011 33 4 23 16 7 60
2012 32 4 23 16 7 59
Total 214 32 181 131 50 427
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Table 2: Summary of mergers and acquisitions transactions
No Acquirer Country Ownership type Target name Ownership type Deal type Year
1 KOOKMIN BANK* KOREA REGIONAL BANK INTERNASIONAL INDONESIA TBK, PT PRIVATE Acquisition 71% 2004
2 OVERSEA-CHINESE BANKING CORPORATION LTD** SINGAPORE REGIONAL BANK NISP TBK, PT PRIVATE Acquisition increased from 22.5% to 51% 2005
3 BANK INTER PACIFIC TBK, PT INDONESIA PRIVATE BANK ARTHA GRAHA, PT PRIVATE Acquisition 100% 2005
4 UNITED OVERSEAS BANK LTD SINGAPORE REGIONAL BANK BUANA INDONESIA, PT PRIVATE Acquisition increased from 23% to 53% 2005
5 ICB FINANCIAL GROUP HOLDINGS AG CHINA REGIONAL BANK BUMIPUTERA INDONESIA TBK, PT PRIVATE Acquisition 58.41% 2006
6 BANK NEGARA INDONESIA (PERSERO) TBK, PT INDONESIA STATE-OWNED BANK TABUNGAN NEGARA (PERSERO) TBK, PT PRIVATE Acquisition 100% 2007
7 PT DIAN INTAN PERKASA INDONESIA PRIVATE PT BANK FINCONESIA PRIVATE Acquisition 51% 2007
8 BANK VICTORIA INTERNATIONAL TBK, PT INDONESIA PRIVATE BANK SWAGUNA, PT PRIVATE Acquisition 99.8% 2007
9 INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA LTD CHINA REGIONAL BANK HALIM INDONESIA, PT PRIVATE Acquisition 90% 2007
10 ACOM CO., LTD JAPAN REGIONAL BANK NUSANTARA PARAHYANGAN TBK, PT PRIVATE Acquisition 55.4% 2007
11 BANK BUKOPIN TBK, PT INDONESIA PRIVATE BANK PERSYARIKATAN INDONESIA, PT PRIVATE Acquisition increased from 24.73% to 65.44% 2008
12 BANK NIAGA TBK, PT*** INDONESIA PRIVATE BANK LIPPO TBK, PT PRIVATE Acquisition unknown remaining stake % 2008
13 BANK OF INDIA LTD INDIA FOREIGN BANK SWADESI TBK, PT PRIVATE Acquisition 76% 2008
14 HSBC ASIA PACIFIC HOLDINGS (UK) LTD GREAT BRITAIN FOREIGN BANK EKONOMI RAHARJA TBK, PT PRIVATE Acquisition 88.89% 2009
15 BANK MULTICOR TBK, PT INDONESIA PRIVATE BANK WINDU KENTJANA INTERNASIONAL TBK, PT PRIVATE Acquisition 100% 2009
16 BANK RAKYAT INDONESIA (PERSERO) TBK, PT INDONESIA STATE-OWNED BANK JASA ARTA, PT PRIVATE Acquisition 100% 2009
17 BANK CENTRAL ASIA TBK, PT INDONESIA PRIVATE PT BANK UIB PRIVATE Acquisition 100% 2010
18 PT BANK UOB BUANA TBK INDONESIA PRIVATE BANK UOB INDONESIA, PT PRIVATE Acquisition 100% 2010
19 BANK OCBC NISP SINGAPORE REGIONAL BANK OCBC INDONESIA, PT PRIVATE Acquisition increased from 1% to 100% 2011
20 BANK RAKYAT INDONESIA (PERSERO) TBK, PT INDONESIA STATE-OWNED BANK AGRONIAGA TBK, PT PRIVATE Acquisition 88.649% 2011
Notes: All target banks are Indonesian. *The acquisition of KOOKMIN BANK by BANK INTERNASIONAL INDONESIA occurred in December 2003 and is the first transaction included in the sample. **Following the acquisiton of
BANK NISP by OCBC in 2005, BANK NISP was renamed BANK OCBC NISP. ***LIPPO BANK officially merged with BANK CIMB NIAGA in 2008 to form the new entity BANK CIMB NIAGA, which is the Indonesian subsidiary
of CIMB Group. A regional foreign acquisition is defined as an acquisition by an investor whose country of origin is a Southeast Asian or East Asian country. Thus, regional foreign acquisitions include but are not limited to acquisitions
from investors originating from the ASEAN countries.
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Table 3: Variables used in profit and cost efficiency estimations
Variable Mean SD Min Max
Profit (cost) (in million US $)
Total profits 144.86 386.39 -655.58 2885.01
Total costs 341.74 596.59 0.53 3506.23
Input prices
Cost of capital (w1) 0.22 2.69 0.01 55.04
Cost of physical capital (w2) 2.08 2.16 0.06 11.73
Cost of labor (w3) 29.19 115.42 0.46 1404.11
Output quantities (in million US $)
Loans (q1) 2596.81 5114.45 1.07 38700
Securities investments (q2) 1488.96 3284.35 3.05 21800
Notes: This table shows the descriptive statistics of basic variables used in the profit and cost efficiency
estimations. In our translog-based estimations of profit (cost) efficiency scores, total profits are profits
before tax and total costs are total operating costs, defined as the sum of interest expenses, salaries
and employee benefits and other operating costs. Output variables considered are: loans, defined as the
difference between the gross loans and the reserves allocated for non-performing loans, and securities
investments. The input variables are: cost of capital, defined as interest expenses divided by total
deposits, cost of physical capital, defined as overhead expenses other than personnel expenses divided by
the book value of fixed assets, and cost of labor, defined as personnel expenses divided by the number of
employees.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max
Performance measures
PE SCORE 424 0.45 0.11 0.28 0.99
CE SCORE 424 0.95 0.04 0.71 0.99
PE RANK 424 27.34 15.89 1 60
CE RANK 424 27.34 15.89 1 60
NIM 427 5.32 3.06 -12.51 23.45
ROA 427 1.65 4.33 -72.45 16.85
ROE 427 11.56 43.45 -650.26 216.16
TCTR 427 21.5 17.89 -22.29 146.85
CIR 427 62.19 49.53 12.17 873.58
Risk exposure measures
ETA 427 14.84 11.77 -27.49 68.8
TIER1 427 11.91 15.03 -39.62 136.3
NCO 427 0.5 1.21 -3.22 13.85
NPL 427 3.01 2.70 0 7.83
LATA 427 25.75 14.02 5.02 84.33
Control variables
SIZE 427 4720.5 9291.64 5.81 65700
SHARE 427 1.73 3.21 0.003 17.92
Notes: CE SCORE is the cost efficiency score. CE RANK is the cost efficiency rank.
PE SCORE is the profit efficiency score. PE RANK is the profit efficiency rank.
NIM is the net interest margin. ROA is the return on average assets. ROE is the
return on average equity. TCTR is the total cost to total revenue ratio. CIR is the cost
to income ratio. ETA is equity to total assets. TIER1 is the tier 1 capital ratio. NCO
is net charge offs to average loans. NPL is non-performing loans to total loans. LATA
is liquid assets to total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of lagged total assets (in
million US$). SHARE is lagged market share.
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Table 5: Bank performance results
CE CE PE PE NIM ROA ROE TCTR CIR
SCORE RANK SCORE RANK
FB 0.001 3.045* -0.011** 2.957** -0.404 0.428 7.446** 3.104* -7.629***
(0.005) (1.819) (0.004) (1.422) (0.303) (0.353) (3.538) (1.72) (2.466)
SOB 0.008** -0.399 -0.086*** 19.52*** 1.115* -1.683* -2.743 -5.407* 11.82***
(0.004) (3.333) (0.028) (4.491) (0.618) (0.958) (5.899) (3.068) (3.111)
DA-S 0.02*** -11.57*** 0.093*** -12.18*** -2.755*** 2.348*** 4.959 5.688* -2.27
(0.004) (2.758) (0.021) (2.922) (0.756) (0.786) (4.543) (3.325) (3.128)
FA-S 0.004 4.958** -0.026*** 12.50*** -0.189 0.195 8.463 -5.354** -5.583
(0.003) (2.483) (0.008) (1.914) (0.313) (0.941) (7.439) (2.652) (3.758)
DA-D -0.011** 8.856** -0.117*** 16.05*** 3.327*** -2.792*** -6.792* -8.907** 10.97***
(0.005) (3.741) (0.027) (5.155) (0.781) (0.768) (3.891) (4.138) (4.075)
FA-D -0.016*** 10.73*** 0.025** -4.083 -0.749 -0.188 -1.209 15.28** 6.718
(0.003) (2.722) (0.011) (2.618) (0.456) (0.786) (8.463) (6.791) (7.054)
LISTED 0.032*** -14.56*** 0.003 9.723*** -1.26*** -0.948* -13.34*** -6.041*** 18.71***
(0.005) (1.858) (0.006) (1.646) (0.334) (0.512) (4.323) (1.703) (2.581)
BUSINESS 0.01** -1.834 -0.004 -0.448 0.512 -0.013 -3.387 -0.641 4.182
(0.004) (2.794) (0.012) (4.862) (0.336) (0.338) (4.702) (2.571) (3.561)
SIZE -0.0003 -2.885*** 0.011** 0.894 -0.207 0.379 6.872* -4.436*** -6.847***
(0.001) (0.833) (0.005) (0.890) (0.135) (0.309) (3.551) (1.27) (2.621)
SHARE -0.001*** 1.864*** 0.007*** -2.632*** 0.223*** 0.055 -0.148 1.354*** -0.654
(0.000) (0.52) (0.001) (0.384) (0.074) (0.093) (0.937) (0.44) (0.721)
Constant 0.925*** 78.77*** 0.379*** 12.86 8.522*** -3.194 -74.20 86.50*** -1.281
(0.017) (11.72) (0.071) (12.64) (1.809) (3.966) (45.97) (16.63) (1.442)
Sigma 13.74*** 13.59***
(0.411) (0.411)
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360
R2 0.226 0.618 0.178 0.079 0.082 0.196 0.269
Notes: All specifications include year fixed effects (not shown).
Standard errors used in computing t statistics are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and correlation across multiple observations of the same bank using a robust cluster
method. ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
CE SCORE is the cost efficiency score. CE RANK is the cost efficiency rank. PE SCORE is the profit efficiency score. PE RANK is the profit efficiency rank. NIM is the
net interest margin. ROA is the return on average assets. ROE is the return on average equity. TCTR is the total cost to total revenue ratio. CIR is the cost to income ratio.
FB is a dummy variable for foreign banks that underwent no changes in ownership over the sample period. SOB is a dummy variable for state-owned banks that underwent no
changes in ownership over the sample period. DA-S is a dummy variable for banks that underwent at least one domestic acquisition over the sample period. FA-S is a dummy
variable for banks that underwent at least one foreign acquisition over the sample period. DA-D is a dummy variable for the years following domestic acquisition. FA-D is a
dummy variable for the years following foreign acquisition. LISTED is a dummy variable for publicly traded banks. BUSINESS is a dummy variable for acquisition by an
investor whose main business is banking. LATA is liquid assets to total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of lagged total assets (in million US$). SHARE is lagged market
share.
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Table 6: Bank risk exposure results
ETA TIER1 NCO NPL LATA
FB 0.55 -2.611 0.348** -1.407* -0.008
(1.148) (1.684) (0.147) (0.771) (0.017)
SOB -7.811*** 2.587 0.133 -9.075* -0.033
(2.333) (2.205) (0.291) (5.382) (0.025)
DA-S 9.594*** -5.029*** 0.592** -2.786** -0.04**
(3.251) (1.314) (0.287) (1.29) (0.018)
FA-S -5.229*** 3.629 -0.616*** -0.711 0.165**
(1.429) (3.473) (0.153) (0.998) (0.064)
DA-D -12.24*** 7.392*** 0.098 1.687 0.006
(3.492) (2.564) (0.393) (1.445) (0.027)
FA-D 8.443*** -2.046 0.606*** -1.824 -0.152**
(2.686) (8.869) (0.202) (1.282) (0.068)
LISTED -2.159* -2.497 -0.091 0.396 -0.056***
(1.29) (1.62) (0.126) (0.528) (0.017)
BUSINESS -0.117 1.182 -1.058*** 1.052 0.0266
(1.273) (2.556) (0.289) (0.816) (0.023)
SIZE -1.055 -3.872*** 0.216*** -0.656 -0.019***
(0.667) (1.295) (0.069) (0.433) (0.007)
SHARE 0.259 1.316*** -0.006 1.41** 0.009***
(0.297) (0.377) (0.025) (0.671) (0.002)
Constant 29.34*** 63.38*** -2.648*** 12.01** 0.624***
(8.813) (16.88) (0.961) (5.651) (0.096)
Observations 360 360 360 360 360
R2 0.141 0.126 0.155 0.165 0.189
Notes: All specifications include year fixed effects (not shown).
Standard errors used in computing t statistics are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and correlation
across multiple observations of the same bank using a robust cluster method. ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
ETA is equity to total assets. TIER1 is the tier 1 capital ratio. NCO is net charge offs to average loans.
NPL is non-performing loans to total loans.FB is a dummy variable for foreign banks that underwent
no changes in ownership over the sample period. SOB is a dummy variable for state-owned banks that
underwent no changes in ownership over the sample period. DA-S is a dummy variable for banks that
underwent at least one domestic acquisition over the sample period. FA-S is a dummy variable for banks
that underwent at least one foreign acquisition over the sample period. DA-D is a dummy variable
for the years following domestic acquisition. FA-D is a dummy variable for the years following foreign
acquisition. LISTED is a dummy variable for publicly traded banks. BUSINESS is a dummy variable
for acquisition by an investor whose main business is banking. LATA is liquid assets to total assets.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of lagged total assets. SHARE is lagged market share.
42
Table 7: Bank performance results controlling for acquisitions by regional foreign investors
CE CE PE PE NIM ROA ROE TCTR CIR
SCORE RANK SCORE RANK
FB 0.004 2.52 -0.013*** 7.848*** -1.443*** 0.344 20.29*** 4.691 1.179
(0.006) (2.637) (0.004) (1.689) (0.333) (0.583) (7.658) (3.787) (3.752)
SOB 0.005 2.138 -0.094*** 23.23*** 0.633 -1.575 0.951 -4.368 9.817***
(0.004) (3.358) (0.03) (5.059) (0.608) (1.054) (6.254) (3.217) (3.06)
DA-S 0.02*** -11.85*** 0.091*** -11.32*** -2.963*** 2.353*** 7.092 5.903* -1.329
(0.004) (2.848) (0.021) (2.962) (0.766) (0.805) (4.538) (3.387) (3.336)
RA-S -0.01* 6.802** -0.01* -0.813 0.963** 0.322 -15.01** -0.635 -18.47***
(0.005) (3.015) (0.006) (1.599) (0.390) (0.372) (6.441) (4.065) (3.74)
DA-D -0.018*** 14.60*** -0.15*** 29.12*** 1.645** -2.375** 6.933 -7.751* 3.274
(0.004) (4.802) (0.003) (6.185) (0.807) (1.01) (5.495) (4.172) (4.175)
RA-D 0.015** -14.56*** 0.046*** -18.36*** 1.879*** -0.667 -12.20* -3.672 17.77***
(0.006) (4.156) (0.011) (3.792) (0.612) (0.71) (6.289) (2.665) (3.719)
LISTED 0.031*** -12.94*** 0.002 10.84*** -1.322*** -0.932** -12.79*** -5.430*** 18.16***
(0.005) (1.755) (0.006) (1.526) (0.314) (0.461) (3.804) (1.735) (2.341)
BUSINESS 0.008** 0.237 0.003 -2.863 0.937*** -0.093 -7.901* 0.857 4.385
(0.003) (2.683) (0.01) (5.196) (0.323) (0.278) (4.641) (2.014) (3.019)
SIZE 0.0001 -3.377*** 0.011** 0.789 -0.188 0.377 6.890** -4.789*** -6.756***
(0.001) (0.828) (0.005) (0.858) (0.13) (0.304) (3.402) (1.259) (2.493)
SHARE -0.001*** 1.752*** 0.008*** -2.965*** 0.265*** 0.047 -0.551 1.337*** -0.557
(0.0003) (0.36) (0.001) (0.441) (0.07) (0.083) (0.942) (0.424) (0.703)
Constant 0.92*** 84.76*** 0.383*** 13.00 8.462*** -3.216 -75.75* 90.21*** 140.5***
(0.017) (11.67) (0.069) (12.13) (1.75) (3.863) (44.48) (16.39) (32.60)
Sigma 13.76*** 13.35***
(0.404) (0.415)
Observations 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360 360
R2 0.23 0.623 0.197 0.08 0.092 0.185 0.304
Notes: All specifications include year fixed effects (not shown).
Standard errors used in computing t statistics are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and correlation across multiple observations of the same bank using a robust cluster
method. ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
CE SCORE is the cost efficiency score. CE RANK is the cost efficiency rank. PE SCORE is the profit efficiency score. PE RANK is the profit efficiency rank. NIM is the
net interest margin. ROA is the return on average assets. ROE is the return on average equity. TCTR is the total cost to total revenue ratio. CIR is the cost to income ratio.
FB is a dummy variable for foreign banks that underwent no changes in ownership over the sample period. SOB is a dummy variable for state-owned banks that underwent no
changes in ownership over the sample period. DA-S is a dummy variable for banks that underwent at least one domestic acquisition over the sample period. RA-S is a dummy
variable for banks that underwent at least one regional acquisition over the sample period.DA-D is a dummy variable for the years following domestic acquisition. RA-D is a
dummy variable for the years following regional acquisition. LISTED is a dummy variable for publicly traded banks. BUSINESS is a dummy variable for acquisition by an
investor whose main business is banking. LATA is liquid assets to total assets. SIZE is the natural logarithm of lagged total assets. SHARE is lagged market share.
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Table 8: Bank risk exposure results controlling for acquisitions by regional foreign in-
vestors
ETA TIER1 NCO NPL LATA
FB -0.762 -3.046 0.264 -0.101 0.019
(2.117) (3.293) (0.349) (0.699) (0.029)
SOB -8.077*** 1.771 0.140 -8.061* -0.035
(2.49) (2.233) (0.291) (4.809) (0.026)
DA-S 9.359*** -5.376*** 0.595** -2.306** -0.04**
(3.284) (1.395) (0.279) (1.088) (0.018)
RA-S 1.696 0.146 0.0866 -1.163* -0.032
(2.322) (3.303) (0.402) (0.638) (0.033)
DA-D -14.54*** 4.121* -0.077 6.225 0.01
(3.653) (2.385) (0.356) (4.316) (0.032)
RA-D 1.337 3.351 0.012 -4.278 0.0001
(1.753) (2.653) (0.278) (3.781) (0.031)
LISTED -2.043 -2.234 -0.113 0.136 -0.05***
(1.268) (1.613) (0.132) (0.477) (0.017)
BUSINESS 1.408 2.371 -1.034*** -0.837 -0.021
(1.05) (2.034) (0.308) (0.545) (0.023)
SIZE -1.227* -3.865*** 0.207*** -0.591 -0.017**
(0.658) (1.322) (0.071) (0.414) (0.007)
SHARE 0.333 1.375*** -0.003 1.309** 0.008***
(0.295) (0.374) (0.027) (0.611) (0.002)
Constant 31.48*** 63.38*** -2.533*** 11.05** 0.595***
(8.707) (17.12) (0.932) (5.37) (0.094)
Observations 360 360 360 360 360
R2 0.139 0.127 0.153 0.174 0.176
Notes: All specifications include year fixed effects (not shown).
Standard errors used in computing t statistics are corrected for both heteroskedasticity and correlation
across multiple observations of the same bank using a robust cluster method. ∗p < 0.1, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05 and
∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.001.
ETA is equity to total assets. TIER1 is the tier 1 capital ratio. NCO is net charge offs to average loans.
NPL is non-performing loans to total loans.FB is a dummy variable for foreign banks that underwent
no changes in ownership over the sample period. SOB is a dummy variable for state-owned banks that
underwent no changes in ownership over the sample period. DA-S is a dummy variable for banks that
underwent at least one domestic acquisition over the sample period. RA-S is a dummy variable for banks
that underwent at least one regional acquisition over the sample period.DA-D is a dummy variable for
the years following domestic acquisition. RA-D is a dummy variable for the years following regional
acquisition. LISTED is a dummy variable for publicly traded banks. BUSINESS is a dummy variable
for acquisition by an investor whose main business is banking. LATA is liquid assets to total assets.
SIZE is the natural logarithm of lagged total assets. SHARE is lagged market share.
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